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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study was to identify limitations and incentives in reporting clinically suspect 
situations, possibly caused by Classical Swine Fever (CSF), to veterinary authorities with the 
ultimate aim to facilitate early detection of CSF outbreaks. Focus group sessions were held 
with policy makers from the veterinary authorities, and representatives of veterinary 
practitioners and pig farmer unions. Personal interviews with a small group of pig farmers and 
practitioners were held to check limitations raised and solutions proposed during the focus 
group sessions. An electronic questionnaire was mailed to pig farmers and practitioners to 
investigate perceptions and attitudes with respect to clinically suspect situations possibly 
caused by CSF. After triangulating the responses of veterinary authorities, veterinary 
practitioners and farmers, six themes emerged across all groups: 1) lack of knowledge on the 
early signs of CSF; 2) guilt, shame and prejudice; 3) negative opinion on control measures; 4) 
dissatisfaction with post-reporting procedures; 5) lack of trust in government bodies; 6) 
uncertainty and lack of transparency of reporting procedures. 
The following solutions to facilitate early detection of CSF were put forward: a) development 
of a clinical decision support system for vets and farmers, in order to get faster diagnosis and 
detection of CSF; b) possibility to submit blood samples directly to the reference laboratory to 
exclude CSF in a clinical situation with non-specific clinical signs, without isolation of the 
farm and free of charge for the individual farmer; c) decrease social and economic 
consequences of reporting CSF, for example by improving the public opinion on first reports; 
d) better schooling of veterinary officers to deal with emotions and insecurity of farmers in 
the process after reporting; e) better communication of rules and regulations, where to report, 
what will happen next; f) up-to-date website with information and visual material of the 
clinical signs of CSF. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Outbreaks of notifiable contagious animal diseases (NADs), such as foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD), avian influenza (AI) and classical swine fever (CSF), have large societal and personal 
consequences. Livestock farmers and veterinary practitioners are at the frontline of 
surveillance, and hence it is widely recognized that they play a key role in detecting first 
occurrences of NADs. In theory, notification of contagious livestock diseases by farmers to 
the veterinary authorities can be an effective early detection tool. Therefore, formal rules for 
reporting clinically suspect situations in livestock by farmers and veterinary practitioners are 
laid down in national and international legislation all over the world. In the Netherlands it all 
started with the Dutch Cattle Act, which was officially put into force in the year 1870 
(Wester, 1939). It consisted of a list of contagious diseases like rinderpest, anthrax, rabies and 
FMD. Furthermore, it contained regulations for reporting of affected and suspect livestock to 
the mayor of the municipality by farmers; obligatory reporting by veterinary practitioners; 
isolation and prohibition of transport of sick and suspect livestock, etc. In essence, not much 
has changed with respect to the reporting and eradication process of NADs since those early 
days. Yet, we cannot conclude that the regulations produce a desired effect, because in spite 
of strict rules and regulations, experience has shown that the time between the first clinical 
appearance of a NAD and the actual reporting of farmers of clinically suspect situations to the 
veterinary authorities is often too long, resulting in extensive spread of the disease to other 
farms  (Capua and Marangon, 2000; CFIA, 2004; Elbers et al. 1999, 2004; Gibbens et al., 
2001). 
Investigation of the scarce empirical evidence to date on issues concerning delayed reporting 
and underreporting of clinically suspect situations shows that the problem thus far has mostly 
been approached as a veterinary-technical problem (Elbers et al., 2006). If livestock farmers 
and veterinary practitioners are familiar with the clinical signs of a NAD, they are in the best 
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position to detect NAD suspects. However, often these diseases have not been in the country 
for many years or sometimes even decades, and farmers and some veterinary practitioners do 
not recognize the associated clinical signs any more (Elbers et al., 2002). Furthermore, many 
endemic animal diseases cause clinical signs similar to NADs. After a considerable period of 
freedom from NADs in a country, farmers and vets will have a tendency to think that clinical 
signs observed are caused by an endemic disease and not by a NAD. As a result, farmers fail 
to recognize the need to report these early clinical signs of NADs, which implies that the time 
needed for ultimate detection of a new infection would provide time for the disease agent to 
spread. For instance, many case reports indicated CSF was suspected only after prolonged 
medication had failed to produce desired results (Young, 1970; Elbers et al. 1999). Laboratory 
confirmation would be necessary in order to exclude NADs being the cause of the clinical 
problems observed. However, laboratory confirmation is in many national regulations only 
allowed after reporting to the veterinary authorities. Hence, asking for laboratory confirmation 
may lead to control measures, such as isolation of the farm, until the results of diagnostic 
testing are available. Moreover, isolation of the farm, especially if this happens for several 
days,  may have negative economic consequences for the farmer.  
Only recently, socio-psychological factors have become the focus of interest as 
possible predictors of delayed reporting of clinically suspect situations by farmers and 
veterinary practitioners. Results of a qualitative study among Australian sheep farmers on 
implementing biosecurity measures (Palmer et al., 2007) showed that one of the basic issues 
that may underlie the problem of not reporting clinically suspect situations  to either the local 
agricultural department office or even a veterinarian may be a low level of trust in the 
government as well as agricultural extension agents. This lack of trust in government bodies 
also appeared as an important factor why farmers do not trust government information on 
improving biosecurity measures (Heffernan et al., 2008). This lack of trust is based on 
Published in Veterinary Microbiology 2010; 142: 108-118            . 
 5  
negative personal experiences with the authorities, such as the way the government had 
responded to cases of infectious diseases in the past. A study into Norwegian sheep farmers’ 
showing vigilance in reporting scrapie-associated clinical signs (Hopp et al., 2007), indicated 
that reporting was dependent on both economic and non-economic values. Among the 
economic values considered important by farmers were being offered free examination of 
NAD suspects. Knowledge of disease-associated clinical signs by farmers and worries about 
blaming oneself for experiencing the disease ranked high among the non-economic values.  
Increasing the reporting rate and shortening the delay time for reporting is crucial, but it is 
complicated by the fact that little is currently known about the way farmers behave in possible 
clinically suspect situations, more specifically, their perception and appraisal of the situation, 
the decision process that follows, and the intentions and behaviors that flow from these 
perceptions and decisions.  
The purpose of our study was to identify limitations and incentives in reporting clinically 
suspect situations possibly caused by CSF as perceived by veterinary authorities, pig farmers 
and veterinary practitioners, with the ultimate aim of improving early detection of CSF 
outbreaks.  
 
METHODS  
To learn more about why farmers decide to report or not to report clinically suspect situations 
of NADs, our study combined a qualitative and a quantitative research design. For the 
qualitative part of our study, focus group sessions were held with a group of policy makers of 
the Ministry of Agriculture (4 persons) that were among others responsible for animal health 
policy and regulation; the Food and Consumer Protection Authority (2 persons from the head 
office responsible for disease eradication) that is responsible for the actual emergency 
response when a suspicion is reported or an outbreak is detected; Board members of several 
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livestock sections from the Royal Dutch Veterinary Association (6 persons: livestock 
practitioners themselves, but with an interest in veterinary policy making) and with Board 
members of all three pig farmer unions present in the Netherlands (3 persons, also pig farmers 
themselves) to detect patterns and trends. Subsequently, personal in-depth interviews with 12 
pig farmers (randomly selected from a registry of all Dutch pig farmers) and 5 veterinary 
practitioners (with pig farms in their practice, selected to be more or less representative for 
different geographical areas within the Netherlands) were held to check if there might be 
other limitations, solutions and incentives with respect to reporting clinically suspect 
situations as suggested in the focus group meetings. Most of them had experience with a CSF 
outbreak in their neighbourhood in the past (not necessarily on their own farm), some had 
experience with respect to a visit by the veterinary authorities to their farm due to reporting of 
a suspect clinical situation identified at the slaughterhouse. Based on the results of the 
qualitative research, an electronic questionnaire was sent via an e-mail newsletter to members 
of a large pig farmer organization and posted for three weeks on the website of the Royal 
Dutch Veterinary Association. The questionnaire was subdivided into four sections. Section 
a) asked when and under what conditions one would report a clinically suspect situation. 
Section b) asked about feelings and (economic) consequences one expected after reporting a 
clinical suspicion. These questions were formulated both for the case that, retrospectively, 
clinical signs would indeed turn out to be caused by CSF (true positive), as well as the 
situation that in retrospect it would become clear that this was not caused by CSF (false 
positive). Section c) asked about barriers for reporting; and d) about opinions on national 
regulation explaining when and how to report a clinically suspect situation. Finally, the 
questionnaire did not just probe into possible limitations, but also possible solutions to break 
down the barriers. 
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A grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) was used to analyze the content of 
focus group and in-depth interviews. Each discrete incident, idea, or event was given a name 
or code word that represented the concept underlying the observation. Coded data were then 
isolated, reviewed, and interpreted line by line, to form categories and sub-categories until 
theoretical saturation was assumed (Patton 2002).  Finally, categories and sub-categories were 
integrated to form substantive themes. Overall, six themes emerged from the data.   
With respect to the electronic questionnaire, relative differences in opinions and attitudes 
between veterinary practitioners and pig farmers were tested with a χ2 statistic (Statistix, 
2000).   
 
RESULTS  
Focus groups 
A summary of items indicated as limitations for reporting clinically suspect situations 
possibly caused by a notifiable pig disease by the veterinary authorities, veterinary 
practitioners and pig farmers is shown in Table 1. In Table 2, a summary of possible solutions 
put forward by the focus groups is shown. After triangulating the responses of veterinary 
authorities, veterinary practitioners, representatives of farmers organizations and pig farmers 
in the focus groups and in-depth interviews, six themes emerged across all groups. 
 
Theme 1. Lack of knowledge on the clinical signs of CSF 
During group discussions, government officials expressed their concern that farmers and 
perhaps even veterinary practitioners might be unfamiliar with clinical signs associated with 
CSF. Outbreaks of some diseases have been more than ten years ago, and this might be a 
major cause of not reporting clinically suspect situations possibly caused by CSF. Farmers in 
The Netherlands have more freedom for diagnosing and treating the animals themselves. A 
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large proportion of pig farms (in majority sow farms) are visited every month by a veterinary 
practitioner in the framework of an Integrated Quality Control Agreement. Within this 
framework, pig farmers are allowed to have a stockpile of antibiotics enabling treatment of 
pigs for the period  between visits of the veterinary practitioner and they are allowed to treat 
their animals with these antibiotics without notifying their veterinary practitioner. Small pig 
finishing farms might see their veterinary practitioner once every two months. During the visit 
by the veterinary practitioner, the use of the antibiotics is discussed with the farmer.  There is 
an obligation by law in the Netherlands (MANFQ, 2005) that pig farmers submit blood 
samples (to exclude CSF) to the laboratory within 24 hours after a group of pigs with clinical 
signs of an infectious disease are treated with medicines. Right after the large CSF-epidemic 
in 1997-1998 in the Netherlands, a considerable number of farmers complied to this 
regulation, but in the years after it trickled down to less than a 50-100 submissions annually 
(FSA, 2003)   In order to make an accurate clinical diagnosis, knowledge about clinical signs 
associated with pig diseases is an important job competency for pig farmers. Overall, farmers 
agreed that the first risk assessment is made by the farmer himself. Several farmers admitted 
they might not be able to recognize certain NADs. For example, when presented with written 
cases of pigs with early clinical signs of CSF, many farmers responded that they saw these 
symptoms at least once a week, but did not think it could be caused by CSF. In reality, half of 
these cases were real life cases of CSF.  
 
Theme 2. Guilt, Shame and Prejudice 
Public opinion and social norms were identified by farmers as significantly influencing their 
practice of biosecurity. Farmers interviewed in our study felt that if they reported, and 
especially if they would be the first farmer to report, other farmers might think they had done 
something wrong. This relates to Theme 1, namely many people have erroneous opinions on 
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how diseases spread. A reflection from the focus group meeting: …."Many people would 
agree that farmers with poor hygiene who have illegal practices run a higher risk to introduce 
an animal disease on their farm. Hence people who admit they may have an animal disease on 
the farm are afraid others may think they are unhygienic and have illegal practices". A farmer 
commented that farmers who are the first to report “should be made heroes in the public 
opinion instead of criminals.” Connected to this theme, many farmers expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the obtrusive “circus”, as they called the procedures after reporting. They 
referred to the visits of the specialist-team of veterinarians and governmental officials that 
investigate the seriousness of the report. In order to prevent eventual spread of the NAD, 
these officials park their cars outside the premises, and walk to the farm wearing white 
protective suites and carrying red suitcases with tests and instruments. In the densely 
populated agricultural areas in The Netherlands, where you can sometimes easily spot at least 
half a dozen farm houses in the flat scenery, this means that the village knows about a 
possible suspect situation within no time.  
Individual farmers accused each other of giving the company interest priority over sector 
interest. “When farmers suspect animal diseases, they just quickly sell their suspect animals to 
the slaughter house and wait at least a few days before reporting, so that they can effectuate 
important deliveries before a possible isolation of the farm.” During group discussions, 
several individual farmers also admitted that they sold clinically suspect animals to the 
slaughter house, but not to other farmers. In sum, fear of destruction of personal image and 
being looked upon as a criminal, and fear of deteriorating social networks were among other 
reasons for not reporting possible early cases of a NAD.  
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Theme 3. Negative Opinion on Control Measures 
Farmers held the opinion that the control measures applied by government officials in The 
Netherlands are long and tedious. After notification, in some cases farms may be  isolated  in 
the case animals are sampled to exclude a NAD until test results are announced. This 
normally takes less than 48 hours. However, in some occasions it may last longer, and the 
majority of farmers who had not had any experience with reporting NADs seemed all to know 
these exceptions from hearsay, and they were surprised to hear that in most cases isolation of 
the farm does not last very long.  
Dutch farmers do not receive compensation for losses suffered during this period of 
examination after the notification, although farmers said that the financial “reward” of 
notifying NADs as quickly as possible is that the financial compensation for further 
consequences in case there is indeed a NAD, such as eradication, may be higher:  healthy 
animals are fully compensated, sick animals are compensated for 50% and dead animals are 
not compensated.   
 
Theme 4. Dissatisfaction with Post-Notification Procedures 
Several farmers who had had experiences with notifying the authorities about clinically 
suspect situations were not satisfied with post-notification procedures. After notification, a 
team of three veterinarians visits the farm. These include the veterinary practitioner of the 
farmer, a veterinarian of the Animal Health Service, and a State veterinarian. In some 
instances in the past, governmental veterinarians had made a bad impression by showing lack 
of branch-specific knowledge when visiting a pig farm. In addition, farmers were dissatisfied 
if officials had displayed “detached and arrogant attitudes”, and spend most of the time 
writing instead of personally talking to the farmers. Although in many cases farmers praised 
the professionalism and attitude of the specialist team, in some cases specialists were 
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perceived by farmers as people with limited knowledge on animal disease control. These 
experiences had de-motivating rather than a stimulating effect on farmers to report a next 
possible case of a NAD.  
 
Theme 5. Lack of Trust in Government Bodies  
Farmers not only know the governmental veterinarians from notification procedures, but also 
from other contacts, such as commodity inspections and eradication campaigns. Most officials 
currently are aware of the sensitive nature of the procedure after reporting, and are especially 
trained to deal with farmers’ uncertainties and emotions while performing their duties. Their 
attitudes during commodity inspections, however, may be totally different, which relates to 
the different role they are fulfilling during these activities. Farmers do sometimes not 
discriminate between these roles, and know governmental officials only in their corrective 
role of commodity inspectors.  
In addition, the results indicate that farmers have concerns about earlier animal disease 
interventions by government bodies. Farmers felt that during past NAD eradication 
campaigns, they were pushed aside and they were not in control of their business anymore.  
Moreover, common to all the farmers was the belief that disease prevention measures 
launched by government authorities were not consistent and hence not fair. They felt that the 
government was often giving priority to trade and economic interests. A pig farmer made it 
clear by saying: "pig farms were the first to close down during an outbreak of FMD in the 
dairy sector, while dairy farms were allowed to sell their milk." Likewise, dairy farmers 
complained that pig farmers are allowed to continue long distance international transports, 
whilst they believe these transports are the major cause of infection. Overall, many farmers 
currently have a lack of trust in government officials and as a result find it difficult to accept 
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that government could or would work together with farmers to control NADs. This will be a 
challenge for both the government and farmers.  
 
Theme 6. Uncertainty and Lack of Transparency of Notification Procedures 
Farmers lacked insight into reporting procedures and, perhaps more importantly, the process 
that would follow after a notification. The uncertainty about how long the farm might be 
closed, already mentioned under Theme 3, is but one example of the uncertainty about 
possible consequences of a notification. Tension caused by uncertainty starts with the fear of 
the actual result. Farmers hope for negative test results, but once they have notified the 
authorities, they often expect that the test results will be positive. Farmers expressed the need 
for a web-site that you could regularly visit to check the progress of the notification, or a 
phone number that you could call. Uncertainty also reflects in complaints about the specific 
steps in the notification procedure, such as making the first telephone call to the veterinary 
authorities. In all cases the farmers felt that the person answering the calls needed to be an 
expert with whom they could discuss the seriousness of their report. However, in practice the 
person answering the phone is an administrator and not an animal disease expert. 
Transparency and confidence in the information that is presented are prerequisites for 
controlling animal disease outbreaks. Currently, farmers were hesitant in using formal 
channels because they felt that these sources of information were not up to date or reliable. As 
one pig farmer put it: "you can find more information through informal channels than through 
formal ones". 
 
Questionnaire 
A total of 75 pig farmers and 334 veterinary practitioners responded to the electronic 
questionnaire. The quantitative study covered topics related to Themes 1 to 6 of the 
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qualitative study. Results of the quantitative study underscored the qualitative results. 
However, pig farmers and veterinary practitioners differed significantly concerning opinions 
and attitudes towards reporting clinically suspect situations. Highlights are shown in Table 3. 
Although both farmers and veterinarians were reluctant to report false alarms, this tendency 
was stronger for farmers than veterinarians. For example, farmers wanted more certainty 
before reporting to the authorities. When asked: “if you think that a clinical problem on your 
farm might be caused by CSF, how certain do you want to be before you report to the 
authorities?” 36% of farmers as compared to 20% of vets (χ2 statistic, P=0.003) needed more 
than 80% certainty, 
while 15% of farmers as compared to 7% of vets (P=0.03) needed more than 90% certainty 
before they would report. In addition, a total of 40% of farmers and 49% of vets indicated that 
reporting a suspect situation, when retrospectively this was false alarm, had a (very) negative 
consequence for the financial situation of the farm. Such situations are expected to affect the 
relationship between farmer and vet: 5% of farmers and 23% of vets (P < 0.001) indicated 
that such an event would have a (very) negative influence on the relationship between farmer 
and vet. More farmers (57%) than vets (13%) indicate that they would report (much) faster a 
suspicious clinical situation when there is a strong relationship between a farmer and his vet 
(P< 0.001). Farmers (29%) and vets (31%) indicate that the fuss linked to reporting a suspect 
situation is often a reason for not reporting such a situation. The threat of paying a possible 
penalty for negligence is perceived as an important reason to report a suspicious clinical 
situation by a large minority of farmers (45%) and vets (31%) (P=0.02). Farmers (36%) and 
vets (20%) feel it is more terrible to report a suspect situation, when retrospectively this was 
false alarm, than to have missed a possible case of CSF (P=0.003). Guidelines in the 
legislation and regulations explaining when and how to report a clinical suspect situation 
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possibly caused by CSF, are perceived as: 1) clear by only 34% of farmers and 33% of vets; 
and well thought-out by 24% of farmers 24% of vets.  
 
DISCUSSION 
A response of 75  pig farmers with respect to the electronic questionnaire was 
considered low (estimate of response rate around 5%), the response of  334 veterinary 
practitioners was considered good (estimate of response rate around 40%). The subject of 
reporting clinically suspect situations possibly caused by NADs to the veterinary authorities is 
considered a sensitive item within the livestock industry, and this might be an important 
reason why not many pig farmers have taken the time to respond. Nevertheless, results of the 
quantitative study underscored the result of the qualitative studies and we are therefore 
confident that we have captured what is felt by farmers and practitioners in the field. 
If a pig farmer is familiar with the clinical signs of CSF, he is in the best position to 
detect this disease, because he is on the frontline of animal disease identification and 
responsible for biosecurity measures. Our qualitative findings demonstrated that biosecurity 
behavior (practices employed on farms to prevent and/or control disease) are influenced by 
levels of awareness or knowledge about biosecurity, which is in line with previous research 
(Delabbio et al., 2003, 2004, 2005; Lawson et al., 2001; Heffernan et al., 2008). Farmers' 
knowledge and awareness of the disease and their willingness to report the disease, was called 
vigilance towards disease by Hopp et al. (2007). A recent study by Elbers et al. (2007) 
revealed that Dutch pig farmers have a rather limited knowledge on clinical signs of CSF: 
33% of pig farmers could mention maximally three clinical signs associated with CSF (all of 
them late in the disease process) and 7% of pig farmers was not able to mention one single 
clinical sign of CSF and said they were entirely dependent on the veterinary practitioners’ 
ability to judge a clinically suspect situation. The results of the present study also support the 
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impression that a considerable proportion of pig farmers put the responsibility for judging a 
clinically suspect situation completely in the hands of their practitioner. It should be noted 
that in the course of the decision process to report a clinically suspect situation, the pig farmer 
is still the first person to recognize that something is wrong with his pigs and that he is in 
need of the judgment of his practitioner. As mentioned during the focus-group meetings, pig 
farmers in the Netherlands have the authority to treat their animals with antibiotics out of a 
stockpile (four weeks worth of treatment) obtained from their veterinary practitioner. 
Therefore, there is a risk that pigs with early clinical signs of CSF are treated first (with 
antibiotics) for several days, and when the treatment does not have the desired effect, finally a 
practitioner is consulted for his judgment.  
Linked to this item is the call from pig farmers and veterinary practitioners for internet-based  
information with up-dated photo- and video-material of clinical signs of NADs in pigs of 
different ages. Summarizing, there is a need for continuous training of pig farmers and 
veterinary practitioners with respect to recognizing (early) clinical signs of CSF. This can 
partly be facilitated by offering web-based information. 
 The results of our present study indicate that both farmers and veterinary practitioners 
would report a clinically suspect situation much quicker, if clinical signs of CSF would be 
more specific. However, the lack of specificity of clinical signs of CSF to detect an outbreak, 
especially in the early stage of the disease process, is an important barrier for early detection. 
To supply veterinary practitioners with an additional tool for identifying CSF-suspect 
situations as early as possible, a clinical decision-support system (CDSS) for use on-site is 
being developed (Geenen et al., 2006; van der Gaag et al., 2008). When a pig farm with 
clinical problems is visited, the CDSS leads the veterinary practitioner through a list of 
questions related to the clinical diagnosis of CSF. The answers are entered into a probabilistic 
network, which returns the probability of the pigs having a CSF infection together with an 
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advice how to act. The network includes over 40 variables, of which more than half of them 
can be observed upon clinical investigation, more than 80 relations between these  variables 
and over 2000 conditional probabilities linking events within the network. The variables 
capture processes in the underlying pathogenesis, risk factors, relevant clinical signs and 
various alternative explanations for these signs. 
 Farmers lacked insight into reporting procedures and, perhaps more importantly, the 
process that would follow after a notification. A high level of transparency of the notification 
process, and what to expect after notification would help to decrease the uncertainty farmers 
feel. Furthermore, transparency with respect to the notification process will help to build-up 
trust of the farmer community in the veterinary authorities, and trust in each other might 
prove to be a key issue in trying to improve early detection of NADs. A clear explanation of 
the National Guidelines explaining when, what and how to report a clinical suspect situation, 
and a transparent decision-tree on what to expect in time after the notification up to the final 
decision to clear the farm of suspicion or to isolate the farm because of a laboratory 
confirmation of an infection with a NAD, would be helpful. This can be facilitated by the 
veterinary authorities by means of offering web-based information. 
It is without discussion that if there are disease-specific clinical signs or other not-to-
miss signs like progressive and exponential mortality, there should be immediate reporting to 
the veterinary authorities. However, in practice these black-and-white situations do not often 
occur.  In-between the black-and-white situations that clearly there is - or there is no – clinical 
indication for a suspicion of a NAD, there is a large grey area where a farmer and veterinary 
practitioner can not totally rule-out a notifiable disease solely on the basis of a clinical 
inspection. And this will be more the case if you are looking at the beginning of the disease 
process, when non-specific signs will gradually show in a few animals. The possibility to 
submit samples from selected animals of pig farms by veterinary practitioners to a reference 
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laboratory in the case of  non-specific clinical signs, to rule-out disease caused by a CSF, 
without involvement of the authorities and without isolation of the farm, might be a solution 
to increase the probability of early detection (Elbers et al., 2007). The alternative is that 
farmers will wait for several days, use medication for an extended period of time to solve the 
increasing problem, until one realizes too late that one is hit by a catastrophe because the 
clinical problems have accumulated exponentially. This tool is in operation in the 
Netherlands, and was started when there was a direct threat due to CSF-outbreaks in Germany 
close to the border with the Netherlands in the Spring of 2006. However, after the direct threat 
had disappeared in 2006, the use of the tool became very limited. This is a bit surprising, 
because it can be imagined that there would be several situations in which one would like to 
rule out CSF in a situation in which CSF is not the first on the differential diagnosis list to 
think of as a possible cause for the clinical problems seen in a pig farm. Farmers and 
veterinarians indicated that the costs for the individual farmer to use this tool (taking blood 
samples, veterinarian visits, sending samples by mail to reference laboratory) are still too 
high. They propose to have these costs being covered by the central emergency fund, because 
their use of exclusion diagnostics is to protect the sector for a disaster, and there should not be 
financial barriers for the individual farmer to do so. The veterinary authorities indicate that 
they have gone far to facilitate the use of this additional tool and are not willing to go any 
further. The impasse has to be broken to make new progress, communication and building 
trust between veterinary authorities and farmers should be a first start. 
There seems to be a gap between what the authorities expect from pig farmers and 
veterinary practitioners regarding reporting a clinically suspect situation and what pig farmers 
and vets really feel as their responsibility. There is a common belief among pig farmers and 
farmer unions that NADs are the primary responsibility of the government. Changing such an 
attitude and thinking will take a huge effort in communication preparation and time. 
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Important requirements to achieve that goal are: a credible communicator, a high level of 
similarity between the audience (farmers) and the communicator, and finally the message and 
the communicator must be perceived as trustworthy (Heffernan et al., 2008). Since 
government bodies are not perceived as highly credible and/or trustworthy by livestock 
farmers (Bennet and Cooke, 2005; Hood and Seedsman, 2004; Poortinga ety al., 2004; van 
Haaften et al., 2004)), there is a specific need for a figurehead arising from the pig industry to 
take on that challenge. 
 It appears that the relationship between farmer and practitioner plays a role in the 
willingness to report a suspect situation, and that there is also an area of tension between 
farmer and vet if it comes to reporting (retrospectively) a false alarm: “do I (farmer) trust the 
competence of my vet?” and “Am I (vet) loosing a client (farmer) if my reporting is a false 
alarm?” Our present study indicates that vets have a much more negative image of the 
consequences of a false alarm for the relationship between farmer and vet than the farmer has. 
This would call for  recalibration of the relationship between vets and farmers by the vets.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
From our present study, the following recommendations are made to facilitate early detection 
of CSF: a) development of a clinical decision support system for veterinary practitioners and 
farmers, in order to get faster diagnosis and detection of CSF; b) possibility to submit blood 
samples directly to the reference laboratory to exclude CSF in a clinical situation with non-
specific clinical signs, without isolation of the farm and completely free of charge for the 
individual farmer (group interest paid by communal funds); c) decrease social and economic 
consequences of reporting CSF, for example by improving the public opinion on first reports; 
d) better training of governmental employees to deal with emotions and insecurity of farmers 
in the process after reporting; e) better communication of rules and regulations, where to 
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report, what will happen next (decrease insecurity, increase sense of control);  f) up-to-date 
website with information and visual material of the clinical signs of CSF. 
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Table 1. Items indicated by focus groups as limitations with respect to reporting a clinically suspect situation on a pig farm possibly caused by Classical Swine Fever (CSF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 
Item Veterinary authorities Veterinary Practitioners Pig farmers 
1. Difficulties with 
risk assessment 
Unfamiliarity with clinical signs of CSF, 
especially with farmers and veterinary 
practitioners with only few pig farms as clients. 
More problematic if last outbreak is some time 
ago. Farmer perceives risk of having CSF higher 
for neighbor than for his own farm 
There is a large grey area, e.g. increased mortality 
combined with non-specific clinical signs. There 
are several (non-defined) factors playing a role in 
the decision process to report a suspicious 
situation. Even with very high mortality, some 
farmers do not think there is a real problem. 
Related problem: farmers applying medication (no 
supervision and correction by veterinary 
practitioner) 
You make your own risk assessment of the 
probability that the clinical problems on your farm 
are caused by CSF, and you do not call in a second 
opinion in order to prevent negative (financial) 
consequences 
2. Characteristics of 
disease 
 The higher the probability of infection, the faster 
one would report. When there are no outbreaks in 
neighboring countries, the probability of infection 
is estimated to be low 
There is a high probability that clinical problems 
are not caused by CSF and therefore it is difficult 
to report such a situation. You want to prevent 
raising a false alarm. If you are very sure it is CSF, 
you want to report as soon as possible 
 
3. Negative 
consequences 
Both for farmers as for veterinary practitioners. 
They are both vulnerable due to specialization. 
When there is a real outbreak, limitation of 
movement or stamping-out policy applied in 
neighborhood may lead to the question of guilt 
Especially the social consequences are high when 
a false alarm is raised (strangers on the premises). 
Farmers are not willing to spend money on 
medical treatment of their animals and super-
vision, especially if it concerns the protection of 
the interests of the pig industry as a whole when 
they think it is not in their own personal interest 
 
Consequences will play a role on the background.   
It is felt as very negative that others (authorities) 
take over the farm during an investigation of a 
suspicion, you are not your own master anymore 
on your own farm  
4. Guilt, shame and 
prejudice 
Farmers having a CSF outbreak are perceived as 
being non-hygienic, and have illegal businesses 
Farmers do not want to have strangers with 
unfamiliar cars on their premises to be seen by the 
neighbors or have the major of the town visiting 
them in the evening for a serious talk 
 
The farmer that is reporting should be treated as a 
hero, he takes responsibility for the pig industry as 
a whole. In practice he is looked upon as a 
criminal  
5. Earlier experience 
with reporting 
Association between earlier negative experiences 
and tendency to not to report too quickly 
If you have reported once, the next time will be 
easier, you know what will happen  
 
A considerable number of negative examples are 
known in the farmer community. Experiences will 
not be motivating, rather demotivating 
 
6. Negative image 
and mistrust of 
veterinary 
authorities  
Farmers and veterinary practitioners have a 
negative image of the veterinary authorities due 
to experiences with procedural mistakes and  
lack of expertise of veterinary officers 
Perceived unfairness with respect to the reporting 
station. There is no possibility to discuss with the 
reporting station to come to a mutual conclusion. 
The person answering the phone has no veterinary 
knowledge. The officer visiting the farm is 
sometimes not competent. State veterinary officers 
sometimes have a bad hygienic consciousness 
The specialist team visiting the farm are 
sometimes arrogant, there is too much focus on 
external appearances. Farmers feel intimidated, 
they feel not to be one’s own master anymore on 
their own farm, you are not involved (as an equal 
partner) in the discussions on what disease could 
have caused the clinical problems on the farm 
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1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 
7. Unclear 
procedures  
 Especially the case with non-experienced people Protocols used by the veterinary authorities 
change  too often, and as a consequence you don’t 
know what you are up to. Via informal channels 
you know more than via formal channels 
 
8. Don’t recognize 
ethical component  
The consciousness for ethical principles will 
continuously decrease (in veterinarians) the day 
they leave vet school and start working in a 
veterinary practice 
There is only a small core group of active 
veterinary practitioners in the field that is 
concerned about this item 
Other livestock industries don’t take their 
responsibility highly (e.g. poultry with respect to 
Avian Influenza), but pig industry is very 
responsible 
 
9. Conflict of interest Believe that farmers will postpone a report of a 
suspicious situation until a planned shipment of 
pigs is executed; that farmers will quickly ship-
out pigs when there are rumors of a CSF 
outbreak; that the pig industry is doing business 
with dubious countries although they know what 
is going on in those countries;  Farmers, traders, 
veterinary practitioners (farmer as client) all 
have strong personal interests 
 
The interest of the individual farmer (economic) 
versus public health interests; interest of veterinary 
practitioner : integrity versus a good relationship 
with client; interest of individual farmer versus 
interest of industry 
 
The interest of the individual farm/farmer is often 
the most important 
10. Non-transparent  
or conflicts in 
legislation 
 in animal sectors (dairy in cattle industry, broilers 
in poultry industry) with frequent contact between 
farmer and practitioner, unclear procedures or 
legislation is not a problem because you will fix 
the problem together. In other sectors (e.g. pig 
finishing farms) with less contact, you need all the 
support of the law to keep your back straight 
 
 
11. 11. Procedural 
injustice 
  
 
Legislation is often arbitrary, authorities only 
awake when there is a need for “excluding CSF as 
cause of problems”. Where is the right cut-off ? 
Do we have to be 5%, 20% or 80% certain that we 
have the disease before we want to exclude CSF ?  
Farmer is always blamed, but he is the least 
competent to take the decision. During the Foot 
and  Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001, there was 
no FMD in pigs, but pig farms were isolated for a 
long period, while dairy farms could continue to 
ship off milk from their farms 
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2.  Solutions for limitations with respect to reporting a clinically suspect situation on a pig farm possibly caused by Classical Swine Fever (CSF), as indicated by focus groups 
Solution 
 
Veterinary authorities Veterinary practitioners Pig farmers 
1. Shortening of 
isolation period 
Is already accomplished for CSF due to 
use of PCR test  
A procedure for fast exclusion of a possible 
NAD causing a suspect but non-specific 
situation must be made available  
 
Is already reasonably short, about 24 hours is feasible for 
many pig farmers to wait  
2. Reducing social 
consequences 
 A minimum of publicity, no external signs  No cars near the farm with man wearing “space outfits” and 
carrying red suitcases.  
 
3. Improved 
procedures 
 Make it possible to have a soft reporting: 
exclusion diagnostics in a situation with non-
specific clinical signs, without isolation of 
farm 
Make soft reporting possible: exclusion diagnose-tics in a 
situation with non-specific clinical signs, without isolation of 
farm; consultation with farmer on test result; a more coaching 
role for the vet, not only telling that it is not CSF, but also 
telling what is causing the problems; procedures of a 
reporting should be trans-parent, you should be able to discuss 
your intention to report with a competent person from the 
authorities before you really report; Diagnostic testing, which 
is in the interest of the industry as a whole, should be made 
available without costs for the individual farmer 
 
4. Better tests A more accurate and reliable diagnostic 
test, not sure if this should be made 
available on-site ? 
A fast diagnostic result after testing; testing 
done by practitioners themselves; testing to 
exclude a “possible not situation”; availability 
of on-site tests 
 
A fast, accurate and reliable diagnostic test that is 100% 
accurate during reporting; make a second-opinion available 
for farmers 
 
5. Better 
communication 
between authorities 
and farmers 
In the winter period or because of a 
higher awareness due to outbreaks in 
neighboring countries, have presentations 
about notifiable diseases  
More frequent consultation between 
authorities and the Royal Netherlands’ Society 
of Veterinary Science about specific reports of 
clinically suspect situations (debriefing) and 
protocols 
Communication skills of state veterinary officers have to be 
improved. The obligations and rights of the farmer during a 
visit by a specialist-team should not be handed over in the 
form of a written statement, but should be addressed orally. A 
complaints service should be made available with respect to 
handling a report of a suspicion by the authorities 
 
6. Education   State veterinary officers have to learn to deal with emotions of 
a farmer during a visit by specialist team; officers have to 
have more knowledge about animal husbandry and animal 
diseases  
 
7. Costs of testing 
not for individual 
farmer 
Start a campaign to promote use of PCR 
test by veterinary practitioners and 
farmers 
 
 Costs are not necessarily the problem, but it is a matter of 
principle 
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Table 2 (continued)  
Solution 
 
Veterinary authorities Veterinary practitioners Pig farmers 
8. Financial reward 
to support disease 
control 
 
Rewarding a report from a communal 
fund (filled by industry and government) 
 Nonsense, pig farmers take the financial risks of their own 
farm very serious and would report if there is really a CSF 
suspicion  
9. Punishment Lift the cut back in compensation when 
administrative mistakes by farmer are 
ascertained during farm visit by 
authorities, is very demotivating for the 
farmer and has led to many, non-
satisfactory jurisdictional problems 
 It is good to tackle free-riders (individual risk-takers); 
Livestock sector that creates the problems should pay for 
other sector e.g. in case of FMD starting in cattle. Perform a 
risk analysis and have animal sectors pay to the communal 
fund on the basis of risk analysis (pig sector thinks they have 
better biosecurity than other animal sectors, in particular the 
cattle sector) 
 
10. Support for 
veterinary 
practitioner 
Development of a clinical decision-
support system for early detection of CSF 
An intermediate, a service you could contact 
to discuss your clinical findings and to decide 
if you should report the situation to the 
authorities: an expert system or a competent 
person you could consult by phone (second 
opinion) 
As soon as a veterinary practitioner has made a report, the vet 
has to make a decision: do I only concern myself with the 
possibly infected farm (vet does not get paid for this time 
investment), or do I concern myself with other pig farms. If 
the vet picks up normal routine, the feedbacks from the 
“infected farm” to the vet will stop. Communication about 
what is going on should be continued. Complaint: test results 
are not send to vet or farmer first, but firstly the veterinary 
authorities are informed (seen by farmers as the bogeyman) 
 
11. Support for 
farmer : internet-tool 
  A website with video and photo material of clinical signs of 
CSF; information on when, what and how to report a 
suspicion and description of follow-up process, what to 
expect after reporting   
 
12. Ethical 
consciousness  
Refresher courses for veterinary 
practitioners 
Distribute information via newsletter of pig 
producers on ethical problems; scientific 
meetings for veterinary specialist groups 
 
 
13. Anonymous 
squeal phone line 
Will not work, everybody will cover for 
each other 
Do not report without telling the farmer, 
otherwise you will loose trust of farmer; 
reporting without consent of farmer will create 
problems for veterinary practitioner 
 
 
14. More transparent 
and specific 
legislation 
 Specific and unequivocal legislation (use 
practical field knowledge from veterinary 
practitioners) 
Transparent and unequivocal protocols used by veterinary 
authorities; easy to be found by people who need them (via 
internet) 
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Table 3. Responses by Dutch pig farmers and veterinary practitioners to the electronic questionnaire study 
 
         Reporting behaviour 
  
Item / questions Farmers (in %)                     
N=75 
Vets (in %) 
N=334 
 
Difference between 
farmers and vets:                 
P-value  of  χ2 – 
statistic  
When and under what conditions would one report a clinically suspect situation ? 
 
 
If you think on your farm a clinical problem might be caused by CSF, how certain do you want to be 
before you report ?                                                                                                                        ≥ 50% 
                                                                                                                                                      ≥ 80% 
                                                                                                                                                      ≥ 90% 
     
        61 
        36 
        15 
          
       51 
       20 
         7          
       
         0.10 
         0.003 
         0.03 
 
If I think there is a small chance of CSF on my farm, I shall wait a few days to see how disease is 
developing before reporting 
      
        36 
      
       54 
       
       0.005 
 
If I think there is a small chance of CSF on my farm, I will seek a second opinion before I report it         57        72          0.01 
 
Probability of an outbreak of CSF at my farm or clients is negligible         27          5      < 0.001 
 
I would report (much) faster a suspicious clinical situation when there is regular introduction of new 
animals on the farm 
       
        49 
    
      60 
      
         0.09 
 
I would report less quickly a suspicious clinical situation when general hygienic measures on a farm 
are good 
     
        57 
    
      77 
     
     < 0.001 
 
Farmers and vets have a well thought-out plan in their head how to react if encountering a situation 
that asks for reporting CSF 
       
        38 
    
      49 
    
        0.10 
 
I would report (much) faster a suspicious clinical situation when clinical signs of CSF are more 
specific 
       
        28 
   
      49 
    
     < 0.001 
 
I would report (much) faster a suspicious clinical situation when there is a strong relationship 
between farmer and vet 
     
        57 
       
      13 
    
     < 0.001 
 
 
Feelings and (economic) consequences one expected after reporting a clinical suspicion 
 
 
Reporting a suspicion, when retrospectively this was a false alarm, has a (very) negative financial 
consequence  for the farm 
       
        40 
      
      49 
         
         n.s#. 
 
Reporting a false alarm, would have a (very) negative influence on the relationship between farmer 
and vet 
 
      
          5 
       
      23 
    
     < 0.001 
Reporting a suspect situation, when retrospectively this was really caused by CSF, would have a 
(very) negative influence on the relationship between farmer and vet 
 
        
          3 
        
        7 
     
         n.s. 
 
Barriers for reporting 
 
 
I trust that all pig farmers will do their utmost to prevent an outbreak of CSF in the pig sector 
 
        45       43           n.s. 
The obligation by law to report a clinically suspect situation is the most import reason for reporting 
 
        40       39          n.s. 
The fuss linked to reporting a suspect situation is often a reason for not reporting 
 
        29       31          n.s. 
The difference in compensation between sick and dead animals is a good stimulus to report  
 
        56       44        0.06 
The threat of possibly paying a penalty for negligence is perceived as an important reason to report a 
suspicious clinical situation 
 
       
        45 
    
      31 
   
       0.02 
It is more terrible to report a suspicion, when retrospectively this was a false alarm, than to have 
missed a real case of CSF 
 
        36       20        0.003 
The decision to report or not to report a suspicion of CSF is totally in my hands  
 
        32       72      < 0.001 
 
Opinion on national regulation explaining when and how to report a suspicion 
 
 
National Guidelines explaining when and how to report a clinical suspect situation, are perceived as: 
                                                                                                                                  - Well-thought out  
                                                                                                                                  -  Clear 
        
        24 
        34        
    
     24 
     33    
     
         n.s. 
         n.s. 
 
There is a need for more information (website: photos, video) on CSF characteristics (clinical signs, 
transmission routes etc.).  
    
        25 
   
     60 
  
     < 0.001    
 
 
#
 n.s. : not significant (P > 0.10) 
 
